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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
way, it follows that the mere ownership of the golf course
would not impute such liability for injury to one struck
by a golf ball driven by a player on the course."
Although the game of golf has been played for many
years by hundreds of thousands of our residents, serious
accidents have been so few that there is very little precise
authority to help the courts. 12 However, if our own conception of the few decided cases is correct, there appears
to be no reason for confusing the issues by relieving the
defendant from liability on the theory that there was an
assumption of risk by the injured party. Liability in all
such cases should be sustained only on the ground that
there was a breach of some duty which one party owes
to another, whereby the latter suffers injury, which was
such a consequence as under the surrounding circumstances
of the case, might and ought to have been foreseen by the
wrongdoer as likely to follow from his act. Only where
such a breach of duty is found does assumption of risk become involved.
Alexander Denbo.

NOLO CONTENDERE IN PENNSYLVANIA
There has been somewhat of a conflict of authority
as to the propriety of the plea of nolo contendere in Pennsylvania where defendant is indicted for any crime which
is greater in degree than a misdemeanor.
It is the purpose of the writer to explain
herein the
purpose of entering such plea and when it may be entered
in Pennsylvania so far as the cases have decided. Nolo
contendere is synonymous with non vult contendere (third
person) and non volo contendere (first person).
"The so-called plea of 'nolo contendere' is not a plea
in the strict sense of that term in the criminal law, but a
formal declaration by accused that he will not contehd
with the prosecuting authority under the charge. It is
11Schlenger v. Weinberg, 150 Ad. (N.J.) 434 (1930).
12Toohey v. Webster, 117 At!. (N.J.) 838 (1922).
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said to be somewhat in the nature of a compromise between the state and the defendant."'
Literally the translation from the Latin is "I will not
contest it." "The early records of this ancient plea state
the fact to be that the defendant is unwilling to contest the
question with the crown, and therefore throws himself
upon the mercy of the court. Non vult contendere cum
domina regina, et ponuit se in gratium curiae."'
An implied confession, or as it is termed, a plea of nolo
contendere "is where, in a case not capital, a defendant
does not directly own himself to be guilty, but tacitly admits it by throwing himself on the king's mercy, and
desiring to submit to a small fine, which the court may
either accept or decline as they think proper."3
The plea of nolo contendere has the same effect in a
criminal case as a plea of guilty, to the extent that a
judgment and sentence may be pronounced upon it as if
4
upon a verdict of guilty.
"The difference between it and a plea of guilty appears
simply to be that, while the latter is a confession binding
defendant in other proceedings, the former has no effect
beyond the particular caseY It is an implied confession
of guilt only and cannot be used against defendant as an
admission in any civil suit for the same act.6 An illustration of this would be the following: Suppose D injures, by
negligently driving his automobile, one P. On being arraigned for reckless driving D enters a plea of nolo contendere. Later P, in a civil action, sues D for damages as
a result of D's negligence. If D had pleaded guilty to the
indictment, this admission of guilt could be shown in the
civil contest; but since he pleaded nolo contendere he admitted impliedly his guilt only for the purpose of the
criminal prosecution and this implied admission of his guilt
cannot be shown by P, or any other person suing D civilly
116 C. J. 406.
2Regina v. Templeman, 1 Salk. 55, 91 Reprint 54.
sCommonwealth v. Horton, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 206.
41 Chitty Cr. Law, 428.
516 C. J. 404.
OCommonwealth v. Ferguson, 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 626 (1910).
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for damages arising out of the reckless driving.
The first case in Pennsylvania where this plea is discussed at any length is Buck v. Commonwealth.7 In this
case the defendant had been placed on trial as an accessory to a highway robbery. The two principals had pleaded
nolo contendere to their respective indictments but had not
yet been sentenced. The Commonwealth, during the trial
of the defendant Buck had been allowed, over the objection
of the counsel for the defendant, to introduce the pleas of
nolo contendere by the principals as proof of the guilt of
the principals. The Commonwealth contended that this
evidence was competent because the legal effect of the
plea is the same as the plea of guilty.
The Supreme Court, per Paxson, J., held that the admission of this evidence was error. He said "The plea of
nolo contendere is a mild form of pleading guilty. The
advantage, however, which may attend this plea is, that
when accompanied by a protestation of the defendant's innocence it will not conclude him in a civil action from contesting the facts charged in the indictment."
The Court apparently was aware that at common law
this plea was allowed only where the punishment for the
offense was a fine. This knowledge is imputed from the
fact that the opinion cited Wharton's American Criminal
Law, sect. 533, wherein it is said, "(Plea of nolo contendere) has the same effect as a plea of guilty so far as concerns the proceedings upon the indictment, and a defendant
who is sentenced upon such a plea to pay a fine is convicted
of the offense for which he is indicted."
No comment is made in the Buck case concerning the
propriety of the plea where the defendant is charged with
a felony. The Court admitted that the plea was an implied
confession but held that a confession by the principal is
not admissible upon the trial of the accessory to prove the
guilt of the principal. It was also said that this plea could
be withdrawn at any time before sentence.
In Commonwealth v. Holstine8 the defendant pleaded
T107 Pa. 486 (1884).
8132 Pa. 3$7 (1890).
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nolo contendere to an indictment charging him with the
unlicensed sale of liquor. The Court followed the Buck
case in that this plea was substantially a plea of guilty and
decided that "We may therefore safely pass by the somewhat elaborate argument to show that the defendant was
not guilty."
In Commonwealth v. Jackson9 it was said, citing Buck v.
Commonwealth, "While the plea of nolo contendere when
accompanied by a protestation of innocence will not preclude a defendant in a civil suit from contesting the facts
charged in the indictment, it has the same effect as a plea
of guilty, so far as the indictment is concerned, and when
judgment has been entered on the plea the record is vompetent evidence of the fact of conviction."
A plea of guilty can be put in without leave of the court,
but a plea of nolo contendere can only be made with the
consent of the court. 10 In this case the court notes that at
one time in England the plea was accepted only in cases
where a fine was imposed, but goes on to say that "In none
of the above cited American cases is it decided that if the
court accepts the plea, and the offense is punishable by imprisonment, the defendant may not be sentenced to imprisonment. On the contrary the sentence under consideration in Commonwealth v. Holstinet was to imprisonment."
The most illuminating and determinative case in Pennsylvania is that of Commonwealth v. Shrope 12 wherein the
defendant, to an indictment charging him with murder,
pleaded nolo contendere. Mr. Justice Stewart, after a review of all the Pennsylvania authorities and some of the
authorities from other states, attempts to state the law of
Pennsylvania on this subject.
It is stated unequivocally in the above case that the
plea of non vult contendere is never allowable in capital
cases. "The reason for this limitation becomes apparent
when we consider the extreme penalty that follows a con9248 Pa. 530 (1915).

lOCommonwealth v. Ferguson, 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 626 (1910).
11132 Pa. 357 (1890),
12264 Pa. 246 (1919).
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viction in what we call capital cases. The law is scrupulous
to a degree in such cases to throw about the accused every
reasonable protection, and requires that before conviction
his guilt must be established by evidence which excludes
all reasonable doubt. An implied confession cannot rise to
the degree of certainty which would make it the equivalent of an expressed confession."
The Court says that Buck v. Commonwealth,' allowing
the plea to an indictment for a felony (highway robbery),
does not rule the point because that case was appealed to
the Supreme Court solely on the ground that the plea was
incompetent as evidence to prove guilt, not on the question
of the propriety of its entry where the defendant is indicted for a felony.
The Court in its quotation from the note following
Tucker v. U. S., 41 L. R. A. (N.S.) 70 seemingly approves
and deems correct the statement :--"Constrained to this interpretation of the narrow purpose and use of the plea at
common law, by the express provisions of the rule thus
handed down, we believe extension of the allowance to include even misdemeanors for which imprisonment must
be imposed is unauthorized,-however desirable it may
seem,-without statutory provision therefor."
Mr. Justice Stewart at the conclusion of the opinion
was careful to state that they were deciding nothing but
the impropriety of the plea in capital offenses. However
this may be, the practical effect of this opinion has been
to cast some doubt as to its propriety in any case of felony
and in a Montgomery County court in 1928," the judge,
deciding whether to accept the plea in a case charging
statutory rape, expressed the doubt created by Commonwealth v. Shrope and refused to accept the plea.
Conclusion
The plea is not allowable where defendant is charged
with a capital offense.1 5
18107 Pa. 486 (1884).

14Commonwealth v. McGowan, 12 D. & C.286.
15Commonwealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 246 (1919).
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Most likely it will not be accepted in cases where defendant is indicted for a felony because Commonwealth v.
Buck' 6 is not authority and dictum in Commonwealth v.
Shrope" decides it is improper.
It seems it is allowable where defendant is charged
with a misdemeanor, although the punishment may be fine
or imprisonment or both.'8
Surely it may be pleaded in Pennsylvania where the
defendant is charged with a light misdemeanor punishable
only by a fine. 19
A defendant may not plead nolo contendere to an indictment for statutory rape.20 Is the conclusion of the court
correct? It is based only on the dictum contained in the
Shrope case. Why should any distinction be made as to the
propriety of this plea where the indictment charges a felony
and where it charges a misdemeanor? The criterion seems
to be the magnitude or severity of the punishment, not the
degree of the crime. Since it is true that convictions for
misdemeanors sometimes carry with them greater punishments than convictions for felonies, it ought to follow as
a matter of logic, that this plea is proper regardless of
whether the indictment charges a felony or a misdemeanor
so long as the punishment is not capital, since the plea has
been permitted where the punishment imposed was im21
prisonment.
Herbert Horn.

VIOLATION OF A STATUTE OR ORDINANCE AS
EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
Today, more and more, we find that legislatures are
enacting statutes defining duties which at common law
16107 Pa. (1884).

17264 Pa. 246 (1919).
lsCommonwealth v. Holstine, 132 Pa. 357 (1890).
'gCommonwealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 246 (1919; Tucker v. U. S., 41
L. R. A. (N.S.) 70.
20Commonwealth v. McGowan, 12 D. & C. 286.
"'Commonwealth v. Holstine, 132 Pa. 357 (1890).

